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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the deputy sheriff possess specific articulable facts that 
appellant was involved in criminal activity to justify the 
seizure of Mr. Spidle? 
Did the deputy sheriff have a reasonable belief that appellant 
was armed and presently dangerous to justify the search of 
Mr. Spidle? 
iv. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-21-3(2)(c) (1983 as amended) and Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment of conviction of a Class A Misdemeanor. In the case 
at hand, final judgment and conviction were rendered by the 
Honorable Judge Michael L. Hutchings, Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
v. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
RANDY S. SPIDLE, : Case No. 870145-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Conviction of the 
Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(b)(i), Utah Code 
Ann. (Supp. 1986)(Addendum A). The appellant was found guilty after 
a bench trial during which his motion to suppress certain evidence 
was denied. The Court sentenced him to one year in jail with 185 
days of the jail term suspended upon completion of probation. Judge 
Hutchings stayed the imposition of the jail term pending the outcome 
of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 12, 1986, at approximately 6:20 P.M., Randy 
S. Spidle was arrested in the vicinity of 930 East and Galena Drive, 
Sandy, Utah, by two Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs. The arrest 
followed the traffic stop of a vehicle in which Spidle was the 
passenger. The deputies discovered approximately one-quarter pound 
of marijuana in Spidle's possession. 
On December 12, Rex Kennedy, a Salt Lake County Deputy 
Sheriff, was on routine patrol at approximately 9800 South and 750 
East (Transcript p. 4). He observed a vehicle, a 1965 Rambler, 
which he knew from prior observation to be improperly registered. 
Kennedy initiated a traffic stop, pulling the car over at Hoppy and 
Galena, approximately 1000 East and 9800 South. There were two 
people in the car, the driver and Spidle, the passenger. 
Two or three minutes after the traffic stop, James N. 
Richards, a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, arrived to assist 
Kennedy (p. 5, 9). Richards conducted field sobriety tests on the 
driver at Kennedy's request. During this time Kennedy checked the 
registration on the car and for a driver's license using the name 
the driver had given (p. 6). A check of the vehicle's license 
plate, ADP307, by Kennedy with the State's Department of Motor 
Vehicles computer indicated that the plate belonged on a 1972 Toyota 
(p. 5). The vehicle was impounded (p. 7). 
The unidentified driver was questioned by Kennedy about 
his driver's license and automobile registration (p. 6). The driver 
was not a person known to Kennedy by a previous contact (p. 12). 
Richards administered field sobriety tests to the driver after 
Kennedy noticed the smell of alcohol on his person (p. 5). The 
driver was cited for the traffic offenses of improper registration 
and open container (p. 8). He was not arrested and was not searched 
(p. 12). After the citation was issued he was allowed to leave (p. 
12) . 
Spidle testified that shortly after the vehicle was 
stopped, the first officer on the scene, Kennedy, asked him for his 
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name and said he was going to run a check on him. Kennedy knew 
Spidle from contacts spanning a number of years (p. 10). Spidle 
remained in the passenger seat for the twenty minutes after the 
vehicle stop and before the vehicle was impounded (p. 11). Kennedy 
was alone with Spidle and the driver for the two to three minutes 
before Richards first arrived and for the two to three minutes when 
Richards absented himself to respond to a nearby disturbance (p. 9, 
11). Neither Kennedy nor Richards noticed any unusual movements or 
behavior by Spidle as he sat in the vehicle (p. 9, 21). 
Kennedy asked Richards to remove the passenger, Spidle, 
from the vehicle so that it could be fully searched and impounded 
(p. 7). Richards testified that just prior to this request by 
Kennedy he had asked Spidle for identification (p. 20). Up to that 
point, nearly twenty minutes after the stop, Richards did not know 
who the passenger was nor had he learned his identity from Kennedy 
(p. 20, 21). Although Richards had had no prior personal contact 
with Spidle, he knew of Spidlefs name from other deputies and the 
station bulletin board (p. 22, 25, 26). Richards understood that 
Spidle's criminal record included possession of controlled 
substances and burglary (p. 25). 
Richards testified that once Spidle identified himself he 
was not free to leave, that he was being held or detained (p. 27). 
Richards then conducted a Terry search of Spidle (p. 17). He 
ordered Spidle to open his jacket (p. 23). Spidle was wearing a 
long, heavy army fatigue jacket (p. 24). Richards had not detected 
any unusual bulges that might have indicated a weapon was present 
(p. 25). As Spidle opened his jacket an object, later identified as 
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marijuana, fell to the street (p. 26). No pat search to detect hard 
objects was conducted until after the order was given to open the 
jacket (p. 26). 
Richards testified that the search was conducted out of 
concern for his own safety, that he had decided there was a very 
distinct possibility Spidle might be in possession of a firearm (p. 
25). That concern arose from his knowledge that Spidle had a 
criminal record, was known to have controlled substances on his 
person, and experience that people involved with narcotics or 
burglaries do on occasion carry weapons (p. 24, 25, 28). Richards 
knew of no occasions in which Spidle personally carried a weapon, 
however, and had no knowledge Spidle was carrying narcotics on this 
occasion (p. 28). Richards had not received any report of crime 
that night over the radio or from informants that might have 
involved Spidle (p. 26). 
Richards testified that the search was conducted out of 
concern for his own safety (p. 25). That concern arose from his 
knowledge of Spidlefs past, although he had never met Spidle 
personally, knew of no occasions in which Spidle personally carried 
a weapon, and had no knowledge Spidle was carrying narcotics on this 
occasion (p. 25, 22, 28). Richards had not received any report of 
crime that night over the radio or from informants that might have 
involved Spidle. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Richards lacked the articulable suspicion that Spidle was 
engaged in criminal activity necessary to justify the detention of 
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Spidle in a Terry investigative stop. When the seizure is unlawful 
the evidence resulting therefrom must be suppressed. 
Richards lacked the particular facts from which he could 
have reasonably inferred that Spidle was armed and dangerous 
necessary to justify a Terry frisk to insure the officer's safety. 
When the search is unlawful the evidence resulting therefrom must be 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT WAS AN UNLAWFUL 
SEIZURE BECAUSE THE DEPUTY LACKED A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT HE WAS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. In 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court 
established a limited exception to the general requirement that 
police officers obtain a warrant, based on probable cause, for all 
seizures of persons. The Court recognized that a police officer may 
in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a 
person for purposes of investigating the possibility of criminal 
activity even though probable cause to make an arrest does not 
exist. Id. at 22. A brief detention without probable cause to 
arrest, howevever, which results in any curtailment of that person's 
liberty by the police, must be supported by a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal 
activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah adopts language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of 
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the United States Constitution. Utah has codified the Terry 
requirement that detention of a person by the police must be based 
on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Section 77-7-15 Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states: 
A police officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his namef address, and an explanation of his 
actions. 
See also State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). 
In the present casef Spidle contends that Richard's 
detention of him at the vehicle was an unlawful seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I 
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the brief detention of a person for investigative 
questioning is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Terry 
establishes that for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment a person is 
"seized" when an officer "accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away." This may be accomplished by means of 
physical force or show of authority. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19. A 
person's freedom to walk away must be judged objectively; a person 
has been seized if "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding 
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
554-5 (1980). 
In the case at hand, Spidle was a passenger in a vehicle 
involved in a traffic stop. He remained with the driver and vehicle 
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awaiting the disposition by the deputy sheriffs. Twenty minutes 
after the traffic stop Spidle was ordered out of the vehicle and 
ordered to submit to a search (p. 23). Deputy Richards stated that 
after Spidle identified himself he was not free to leave, that 
Richards was detaining Spidle (p. 27). Spidle got out of the car 
and submitted to search as Richards ordered. 
In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court listed examples of 
circumstances which might indicate a seizure. Included in the list 
were: 1) the threatening presence of several officers, and 2) the 
use of language indicating that compliance with the officer's 
request might be compelled. ijcL at 554. Richard's assertion of 
authority as a police officer in the presence of Deputy Kennedy, his 
express statement that Spidle was being detained, coupled with 
Spidlefs reasonable belief that he was not free to leave, constitute 
a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 14. 
For this seizure to be lawful the officer effectuating 
the detention must point to specific, articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead 
a reasonable person to conclude the person and committed or was 
about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); State v. Swanigan, 669 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1985), State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987). 
In United States v. Hensley, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld an investigatory stop by police officers in 
objective reliance on another police department's "wanted flyer", 
where the flyer was issued on the basis of articulable facts 
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supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has 
committed an offense. An officer recognized the suspect on the 
street, and two other officers, acting on knowledge of the wanted 
flyer, converged on the suspect. The Court upheld the stop even 
though the flyer was based on a crime two weeks earlier, stating 
that a stop is proper to investigate upon reasonable suspicion 
whether a crime has been committed. Id. at 612. In State v. 
Swanigan, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held an investigatory stop 
unconstitutional. Defendant was seen walking in the area of recent 
burglary, and was later stopped by police. Defendant was not placed 
at the scene of the crime nor was he observed engaged in any 
unlawful or suspicious behavior. Id. at 719. Again in State v. 
Trujillo, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals held the stop 
unconstitutional, finding that the totality of the circumstances 
preceding the seizure did not support a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. The defendant was walking State Street in Salt 
Lake City late at night with two companions, and appeared nervous 
when stopped and questioned by police. A search subsequent to the 
stop produced a knife concealed on defendant's person. The Court 
found the balance between crime prevention and unreasonable seizures 
weighed in favor of defendant's right in personal security. Id. at 
90. 
in the case before the court, Appellant argues first that 
the basis for articulable suspicion furnished by the wanted flyer in 
Hensley is not provided by unspecified postings on the police 
station bulletin board and the officer's general knowledge of 
defendant's criminal record. Deputy Richards did not state that the 
station postings specified past criminal activity or an ongoing 
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investigation which focused suspicion on Spidle. No outstanding 
warrants for Spidle were mentioned by either officer. Spidle waited 
quietly in the vehicle for 20 minutes after Kennedy said a warrant 
check would be done (p. 35). Hensley is distinguishable from this 
case because there was no specific basis for stopping Spidle for a 
criminal offense that had earlier been committed. 
Appellant argues that the specific facts articulated by 
Richards to justify the basis for the detention are even less 
substantial that those facts found to provide an unconstitutional 
stop in Swanigan and Trujillo, supra. Neither Kennedy or Richards 
described the scene as a high crime area, nor stated that the time 
of day contributed to their decision. Neither deputy cited an 
ongoing criminal activity in the area, such as burglary or vehicle 
vandalism, that caused them to be more suspicious, and Richards, who 
made the stop, specifically denied receiving any reports of criminal 
activity that night over the radio or from informants that might 
have involved Spidle (p. 26). The initial contact between police 
and defendant was based on the traffic stop of a third person, the 
vehicle's driver, in a routine traffic stop (p. 9). When asked, 
Spidle gave his correct name to Kennedy, who knew him already, and 
then sat quietly in the vehicle for twenty minutes (p. 9). Neither 
Kennedy nor Richards noticed any unusual movements or behavior by 
Spidle as he sat in the vehicle (p. 9, 21). In all of this, there 
are no reports of a contemporaneous crime, as in the burglary in 
Swanigan, nor of recent criminal activity in an arguably high crime 
area, as in Trujillo. Appellant argues that there are jio specific 
facts to justify Spidle's detention, when "a determination 
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of the reasonableness of the police conduct is highly factual in 
nature." Trujillo at 86. 
In asserting the constitutionality of a seizure, the 
rights of individuals to be free from a necessary harassment of 
arbitrary interference from law officers must be weighed with the 
interest of the public in being protected from crime. Trujillo at 
87 (citations omitted); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 
(1983). Here the police-citizen contact resulted from a routine 
traffic stop in which the driver was issued a citation and released, 
without further detention or a search of his person. Spidle was 
detained by the backup officer for nothing more than owning a 
criminal record. The backup officer's actions, without basis in 
specific facts known to him or the supervising officer, violated 
defendant's right again unreasonable seizure without a 
countervailing justification in the public interest. 
POINT II. THE FRISK OF APPELLANT WAS AN UNLAWFUL 
SEARCH BECAUSE THE DEPUTY LACKED A REASONABLE BELIEF 
THAT HE WAS PRESENTLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS. 
As noted previously, in Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court formulated a limited exception for 
investigatory stops to the general rule, under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section XIV of the 
Utah Constitution, that to seize a person police officers must have 
a warrant based on probable cause to believe the individual 
committed a crime. Similarly under the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, Section XIV is the general rule "that the police may not conduct 
a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there 
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is probable cause to do so." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 
(1981). A limited exception to the warrant requirement has been 
created for searches incident to an arrest. "[A] few 'jealously and 
carefully drawn1 exceptions provide for those cases where the 
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law 
officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh 
the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.ff Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979). Terry established a further 
exception: where probable cause to arrest is lacking, but an 
investigatory stop has properly detained the individual, a police 
officer may conduct a limited search for weapons upon a reasonable 
belief that the person is armed and presently dangerous. Terry at 
30. The "inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place. Terry at 20-21. 
Appellant first argues that he was subjected to search by 
Deputy Richards. As he exited the vehicle Richards asked Spidle to 
open his coat so that a Terry search could be performed (p. 17). 
Richards said he was in the process of conducting a Terry search 
when he asked Spidle to open his jacket, and characterized the 
request as an order (p. 22, 23). Richards said the search was 
initiated out of concern for his safety (p. 25). In People v. 
De Bour, 352 N.E. 2d 562, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (N.Y. 1976), the New York 
Court of Appeals found a search had been conducted when an officer 
requested that the person unzip his jacket. When Spidle opened his 
jacket an object, later identified as marijuana, fell to the ground 
(p. 18). 
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Appellant next argues that the search was not justified 
at its inception. In Terry the officer detailed facts and 
circumstances that warranted a reasonably prudent person in 
believing the suspicious individual to be armed and a threat to the 
officer's safety. Id. at 28. Two men hovered at a street corner 
for an extended period of time, alternately walking by a store 
window a dozen times and then conferring briefly. The officer's 
experience led him to infer a burglary or stick-up from these 
facts. Since the suspected crime involved weapons, the officer 
conducted a pat-down of the outer clothing after he stopped the 
individuals. Id. at 6-7. The Court upheld the search. In Sibron 
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Supreme Court found the search 
to be unreasonable, saying that the officer "must be able to point 
to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the 
individual was armed and dangerous." Sibron at 64. The officer 
watched the suspect over an eight-hour period talk with a number of 
known narcotics addicts. The officer reached into defendant's 
pocket and brought out narcotics, the same pocket defendant explored 
as the officer stopped him. The officer did not mention the 
possible possession of a weapon to justify the search. Id. at 64. 
Appellant argues Sibron is controlling. Richards had a 
general, second-hand knowledge of Spidle and an unconfirmed belief 
in a drug and burglary background (p. 25). He understood that 
Spidle was known to have controlled substances on his person (p. 
24). Richards, however, knew of no occasion on which Spidle carried 
a firearm (p. 28). Richards did not state that he suspected Spidle 
of burglary or a drug transaction that evening, which could lead to 
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the inference that Spidle was armed. Spidle was not in a location 
or circumstance, and did not exhibit suspicious behavior, similar to 
the defendants in Terry. But like the individual in Sibron, Spidle 
was suspected of carrying narcotics on his person. Richards 
searched for drugs, found drugs, and rationalized the search for 
weapons after the fact. Under Sibron the search of Spidle by 
Richards was unlawful because there was no reasonable basis in 
particular facts to suggest Spidle was armed and presently dangerous. 
Lastly, under Terry, supra, appellant argues that the 
search was overly intrusive and not reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place. Terry at 20. 
In People v. DeBour, supra, the New York Court of Appeals 
found that the officer's command to the individual to unzip his 
jacket was a minimal intrusion and justified by the observation of 
the officer of a bulge at the waistband which he took to be a gun. 
De Bour, 352 N.E. 2d at 570. Richards did not testified that he saw 
a bulge that might have indicated presence of a gun, but that the 
jacket was so heavy and large that nothing could be detected on just 
plain view (p. 26). Richards did not first conduct a pat-search. 
Appellant argues that in the absence on any outward manifestation of 
a weapon even the minimally intrusive request to open ones jacket is 
precluded. . 
CONCLUSION 
Standing to challenge the seizure and subsequent search 
of Spidle is governed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968), State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). The burden of proof is on the 
party seeking an exemption from the general requirement that a 
warrant be obtained prior to a seizure or search. See Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969). The State has failed to 
provide a basis for such an exemption in the stop and frisk of 
Spidle. 
First, the State failed to show that Spidle was lawfully 
detained upon the articulable suspicion that he was engaged in 
criminal activity. Second, the State has failed to show that Spidle 
was lawfully searched pursuant to a reasonable belief that he was 
armed and presently dangerous. For these reasons, Appellant 
requests that the evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful 
seizure and subsequent unlawful search be suppressed. Appellant 
further request that this case be remanded for appropriate 
disposition. 
DATED this /(?Thh day of November, 1987. 
CH^LE S<j^TH^^/ 
AttorneyTSTAppellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, CHARLES F. LOYD, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and four 
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copies to the Attorney General's office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this /^/7^ day of November, 1987. 
DELIVERED by this day of 
November, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting County Attorney 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
THE"STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RANDY S. SPIDLE DOB 01/03/62, 
Defendant(s i -
Screened by-;—H R Lemcke 
Assigned t o : H R Lemcke 
BAIL $5,000.00 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
Ihe. undersigned Kendra L. Herlin - SLCSO under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNT I 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION"OF-A-€ONTR<>tLED SUBSTANCE, a Class A Misdemeanor, 
at 930. East Galena, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
or about December 12, 1986, in violation of Title 58, 
Chapter~3"T;—Section -$7—Utah- Code—Annotated 4-^53-jr— as amended, 
in that the defendant, RANDY S. SPIDLE, a party to the 
offense, did knowingly and intentionally have in his 
substance, to-wit: more than one 
ounces of Marijuana, a Schedule I 
possession a controlled 
ounce but less than 16 
Controlled Substance; 
THIS INFORMATION 
WITNESSES: 
IS_BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
Rex Kennedy Mike Richards Kendra Herlin State Crime Lab. 
(Continued on page Two) 
INFORMATION 
STATE v. RANDY S. SPIDLE 
County Attorney #86-1-71477 
Page Two 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases the above upon the following: 
1. The statement of Deputy Kennedy that on December 12, 
1986, he pulled over a white Rambler for having a fraudulent 
registration, at 930 East Galena, Sandy. The driver, one Stacy E. 
Brown, had been drinking and there was an open container in the 
vehicle. Mr. Brown and the vehicle's passenger, the defendant, 
here, Randy Steven Spidle were asked out of the vehicle. 
2. The statement of Deputy Richards, who was also at the 
scene, that he was made aware that Mr. Spidle was a known burglar. 
When the deputy started a Terry frisk of Mr. Spidle, he opened the 
defendants coat and saw approximately one-quarter pound of 
marijuana fall out of that coat onto the ground. 
3. Your affiant's observation that the substance weigh1s 
approximately 4 ounces and field tested positive for cannabis. 
4. The statement of the defendant, after Miranda, to your 
affiant that "you've just got me on simple possession. You've got 
to show me with baggies or other packaging to get a felony." "I 
paid two and a quarter ($225.00) for this.'1 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this day of December, 1986. 
Judge 
Authorized for presentment and 
f i l i n g : 
DAVID E. YPCOM, Acting County Attorney 
*>4- , Depu ty 
